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1. Two problems for DRT, and a reduction 
1 . 1  The double negation problem: umbrellas 
In a now classic paper (Karttunen [ 1976]) Karttunen noted that while a dis­
course referent cannot outlive a single negation or a single verb with an inherently 
negative implication (such as fail, neglect or jorget) it wiII not be blocked by a dou­
ble negation. While in ( 1 )  the pronoun it cannot be interpreted as dependent on a 
question and in (2) the pronoun cannot depend on an answer, the definite in (3) 
may depend on the preceding indefinite and the it in (4) can be taken to refer to an 
umbrella. The anaphoric pronouns in (5) can likewise be interpreted as depending 
on the indefinite that preceeds them, even though the latter is within the scope of two 
negations. !  
( 1 )  Bill didn't  dare to ask a question. "'The lecturer answered it. 
(2) John failed to find an answer. "'It was wrong. 
(3) John didn 't fail to find an answer. The answer was even right. 
(4) John didn't remember not to bring an umbrella, al though we had no room 
for it. 
(5) It is not true that John didn't bring an umbrella. It was purple and it stood in 
the haIl way. 
Various authors2 have pointed out that examples such as (3) ,  (4) and (5) are 
a problem for dynamic theories of discourse such as Discourse Representation 
Theory (DRT, Kamp [1981] ,  Kamp & Reyle [ 1993]) , File Change Semantics (FCS, 
Heim [1982, 1983]) or Dynamic Predicate Logic (DPL, Groenendijk & Stokhof 
[ 1991]) .  These theories correctly predict negation to be a plug with respect to 
anaphoric binding and thus fit the facts in ( 1 )  and (2) ,3 but they also incorrectly 
predict a double negation to be a double plug, not a plug unplugged as the facts in 
(3)-{5) would suggest. In DRT for example, the discourse referent that is connected 
to an umbrella in the first sentence of (5) wiII land up in a Discourse Representation 
Structure (DRS , or box henceforth) that is twice embedded to the main DRS and 
that wiII thus not be accessible for future anaphoric reference. An application of the 
DRT construction algorithm to the first sentence of (5) gives the box in (6) as an 
output, while it is the simpler box in (7) that would give the right predictions here. In 
the latter, but not in the former, the discourse referent y, which is  connected to an 
umbrella, will be accessible from conditions in the main DRS. 
© 1994 by Erniel Krahmer and Reinhard Muskens 
Mandy HaIVey and Lynn Santelmann (eds.), SALT IV 179-194, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University. 
1 80 
(6) 
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x 
x = john 
y 
.., .., umbrella y 
x brought y 
x y 
x = john 
umbrella y 
x brought y 
Other formulations of the dynamic perspective are confronted with essen­
tially the same difficulty. In DPL, the negation of a formula cp will act as a'test ' , ir­
respective of the internal structure of cp, and so, since the first clause of (5) is of the 
form "'cp, the anaphoric link between an umbrella and it is predicted to be impossi­
ble. In FCS we have that the first sentence in (5) does not succeed in extending the 
domain of the current file, while a new card for an umbrella is needed in order to 
establish the link between antecedent and anaphoric pronoun. In this paper we shall 
discuss the double negation problem (and the disjunction problem- see below) 
from a DRT perspective, but the reader will have no difficulty in translating our pro­
posed solutions to her favourite dynamic semantic framework. 
While we think that Karttunen's data essentially show that double negations 
are holes for anaphoric linking and thus form a problem for the standard dynamic 
accounts of anaphora, it should be noted that other data apparently point in an op­
posite direction. Consider (8a) for example, a text that is decidedly odd if  the 
anaphoric pronoun is interpreted as depending on no guest, even though the latter 
occurs within the scope of a negation and no other relevant operators intervene be­
tween the would-be antecedent and its dependent element. 
(8a) It is not true that there is no guest at this wedding. ??He is standing right be­
hind you. 
(8b) It is not true that there is no bride at this wedding. She is standing right be­
hind you. 
The oddity of (8a) should be contrasted however with the complete accept­
ability of (8b) and is due, we conjecture, to a uniqueness effect (cf. Evans [ 1977] , 
Kadmon [1987]) . Given some highly unlikely context in which it is understood 
between speaker and hearer that at most one guest can be present at a wedding (8a) 
would be fine. We feel that it is precisely the unlikelihood of such a context which 
explains the markedness of (8a). Note, however, that (8a) is still better than (9) , its 
counterpart with one negation only. 
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(9) There is no guest at this wedding. *He is standing right behind you. 
Another category of prima facie counterexamples to the double negation rule 
is formed by cases where the only plugs intervening between a possible antecedent 
and an anaphoric element are indeed two negations, but where the two still do not 
conspire to form an authentic double negation because they sandwich other material. 
We have in mind cases like (10) , whose first sentence should be rendered as the box 
in ( 1 1) .  Clearly this is as much a case of double negation as the sequence ..,3X""1 is a 
case of double negation in predicate logic. 
( 10) No man didn't bring an umbrella. *It was purple and it stood in the hallway. 
( 1 1 )  x 
-. man x 
y 
..., umbrella y 
x brought y 
Since such apparent counterexamples on closer examination turn out to be 
no counterexamples at all, it seems we can take it as a general rule that as far as truth 
conditions and the possibility of anaphora are concerned double negations in stan­
dard English behave as if no negation at all were present. 
1.2 The disjunction problem: bathrooms 
The double negation problem seems to be related to another one that is also 
generally thought to be a hard nut for DRT and related theories. In (12)4 the pro­
noun it is naturally linked to no bathroom, while DRT and other dynamic theories 
predict no antecedent in one part of a disjunction to be accessible for a pronoun in 
the other part. If we apply the standard construction rules to this sentence we get the 
DRS which is given in ( 13), but in this box the pronoun it cannot be resolved as the 
referent x. 
( 12) Either there's no bathroom in this house, or it' s in a funny place 
(13) 
x 
-. bathroom x v it 's in a funny place 
in thishouse x 
Kamp & Reyle [ 1993]5 remark that it is in fact the presence of a negative el­
ement in the first disjunct which seems to license the anaphora in ( 12), even though 
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negations in themselves usually block the possibility of linking. If there is no such 
negative element, as in (14) ,  coreference is impossible. 
( 14) ?? Jones owns a car or he hides it 
A second observation made by Kamp & Reyle is that sentences of the form 
A or B can in general be felicitously paraphrased as A or otherwise B and this leads 
to a proposal to let the DRT construction algorithm provide for the 'other case' .  In 
( 14) the 'other case' is the case where Jones does not own a car, and thus a revised 
form of the construction algorithm adds a condition to this effect to the second dis­
junct of the DRS for the sentence. The result is shown in ( 15) .  
( 15) x 
x = jones 
Z 
y Y 
.... car y car y v 
.:t owns y 
x owns y 
Z hides it 
z = x 
Here, since it cannot be resolved as y. the revised construction algorithm 
does not lead to predictions different from the original one, but as soon as we tum to 
sentences like ( 12) we see that Kamp & Reyle's revision pays off. The 'other case '  
to be considered now is the case where a bathroom is present and if  this information 
is added to that of the second disjunct we get ( 16) at a crucial stage of the DRS con­
struction. This time it is possible to resolve it as x and the link between anaphor and 
antecedent can be established. 
( 1 6) 
x x bathroom x 
.... bathroom x v in this house x 
in thishouse x it 's in a funny place 
Kamp & Reyle's  treatment of 'bathroom' sentences can perhaps be criti­
cised for not being entirely precise, in the sense that their new construction rule does 
not seem to prescribe exactly what material is to be added to the second disjunct. 
Suppose that we take the rule to be that in construing the DRS for a disjunction we 
should add the negation of the DRS for the first disjunct as a condition to the DRS 
for the second disjunct (call this Rule A). Then the DRS associated with ( 14) would 
indeed be ( 15) ,  but the DRS for ( 12)  would be ( 17) instead of (16) ,  i.e. we get a 
double negation where we want no negation at all .6 
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( 1 7) 
x 
-. -. bathroom x 
in fhishouse x 
x 
-. bathroom x v 
in tlzishouse x it 's in a funny place 
Note the structural similarity between the problem how to get from ( 17) to 
( 1 6) and our previous problem how to obtain (7) from (6). In both cases we should 
like to be able to erase the double negation. An explicit rule to this effect would be 
very much ad hoc however and would be quite unl ike al l other DRT construction 
rules. It would have the useful property of being able to make certain referents ac­
cessible to certain pronouns (e.g. the referent x is accessible from it in ( 1 6) but not 
in ( 1 7» but this very property would also make it be theoretically suspicious for not 
being meaning preserving. If meanings determine context change potentials, as the 
dynamic perspective has it, then a rule to erase double negations that would change 
(6) into (7) (and ( 17) into ( 1 6» cannot be meaning preserving since (6) gives a 
context which does not allow reference to y while (7) gives one which does. 
There is another difficulty with Kamp & Reyle's proposed solution to the 
problem of ' bathroom' sentences: ( 1 6) simply does not have the truth conditions 
that ( 1 2) seems to have. Suppose there are in fact two toilets in the house, one of 
which is, and one of which is not in a strange place; then ( 12) is false according to 
our intuitions, but ( 16) is true since its second disjunct can be verified. We therefore 
tum to an earlier proposal from Roberts [ 1989] , who renders ( 12) as ( 18) .7 The idea 
here is that the material under the negation in the first disjunct is accomodated to 
provide an antecedent to the second disjunct. Since the first disjunct gives a negative 
answer to the question whether there is a toilet in the house, it is natural to interpret 
the second disjunct as pertaining to the possibil ity that there is one. 
( 1 8) 
x x y 
-. bathroom x v bathroom x � ftmny place y 
in tlzishouse x in thishollse x y = x  
From a formal point of view it should be observed that, in a sense which wiII 
be made precise in the following section, ( 18) is equivalent to ( 1 9), the second dis­
junct of its only condition. And indeed, we feel that this is correct, since intuitively 
(12) is equivalent to (20). 
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( 1 9) x y 
bathroom x => funny place y 
in thishouse x y = x  
(20) If there's a bathroom in this house it's in a funny place 
How can we revise the DRT construction algorithm so that it  gives ( 1 9) in­
stead of (13) as an output for ( 12)? Here again we see that if we could but solve the 
double negation problem we would have a solution to the disjunction problem as 
well. For suppose that we would revise the construction algorithm so that at any time 
that a sentence disjunction A or B is encountered a condition of the form (2 1 )  
(instead of the equivalent m v []]) would be added t o  the current DRS (call this 
rule B)�8 then (22) would be the output for (14),  but for ( 12) DRS (23) would be 
obtained. The first of these is indeed correct in the sense that the anaphoric link is 
predicted to be impossible, but in the second we have a double negation again where 
no negation at all is wanted. The problem how to get from (23) to ( 1 9) is formally 
similar to the problem how to get from (17) to ( 16) or indeed to the question how to 
get (7) from (6) . In this sense it can be said that the disjunction problem reduces to 
the double negation problem. 
(2 1 )  
(22) x 
x = jones 
y Z 
..., car y => Z hides it 
x owns y Z = x 
(23) 
x 
..., ..., bathroom x => it 's in a funny place 
in thisholtse x 
It thus seems that if we can revise the DRT box language by adding a new 
negation which obeys the law of double negations (i .e. which allows for cancelling 
double negations) we may not only solve the problems that we have encountered 
with Karttunen's  'umbrella' sentences, but we may also be able to deal with 
'bathroom' sentences. An attempt to carry out such a revision will be made in sec­
tion 3 below, but first let us look into the syntax and semantics of the standard box 
language in some detail. 
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2. Standard DRT: the formalities 
The Double Negation DRT of the next section will be a generalisation of 
standard DRT and for the sake of easy comparison we shall give concise versions of 
the most important DRT definitions in this one. In fact, we shall extend the standard 
syntax slightly and add a sequencing operator ' ; ' which takes two boxes and gives a 
complex box.9 This addition, which seems natural in itself, in fact takes us already 
halfway from the standard set-up to the logic that is discussed in the next section, 
but nothing here hinges on the addition and a formalisation of the core part of DRT 
can be obtained by simply omitting all reference to ' ; ' .  
One of the virtues of  the DRS language i s  that boxes are visually appealing. 
A disadvantage is that they take up a lot of space. This is especially annoying if one 
wants to talk about the box language and boxes need to enter formal expressions in 
the metalanguage. For this reason we shall switch to a linear notation in this and in 
the next section, but in section 4, where we shall have occasion to discuss applica­
tions, we shall switch back to the easily readable box format again. 
The basic ingredients of the DRS language are familiar from ordinary predi­
cate logic; we have terms (constants or variables, the variables are also called dis­
course referents) and at least unary and binary predicate symbols. We use t to 
range over terms, P to range over unary predicate symbols, and R to range over bi­
nary ones. With the help of these ingredients we build up conditions (tp) and DRSs 
or boxes (K) by the following rules , which are presented in Backus Naur Form. 
tp . .  -
K . .  -
PI I tlRt2 I tl = t2 I -.K I KI v K2 I KI � K2 
[xI · · .xn I tpj . · · · ,CfJm] I K1 ;  K2 
In the second clause it is to be understood that n or m may be equal to zero. 
The set of discourse referents {xI , . . .  ,xn} is called the universe of[xl · · ·xn I tpj .  . . . ,CfJm] 
and the conditions tpj . . . . 'CfJm are the conditions of this DRS. As an example of a 
formula in this revised box language a linear alternative for (6) is given in (24) and 
an alternative for ( 1 9) is given in (25). 
(24) [x I x = john, -.[ I -.[y I umbrella y, x brought y)]] 
(25) [ I [x I bathroom x, in-this-lwlLSe x] � [y I funny-place y, y = x]] 
Next, for each condition tp occurring in some DRS Ko we are interested in 
the set ACC( tp) of discourse referents that are accessible from tp (in Ko) and it will 
be expedient to define ACC(K) for each K that is a subDRS of Ko as well. Clearly 
no discourse referent should be accessible from Ko itself, so we set ACC(Ko) = 0. 
Define ADR(K),  the set of  active discourse referents of  any DRS K by letting 
ADR( [xI · · · xn I tpl , · · · ,CfJm))  = {xI , · · · ,xn }  and ADR(K1 ; K2) = ADR(K1 ) U 
ADR(K2). The discourse referents accessible from any subDRS or condition in Ko 
can be computed in a top-down way by the follmving rules. 
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(i) If ACC(-.K) = X then ACC(K) = X 
(ii) If ACC(K] v K2) = X then ACC(K]) = X and ACC(K2) = X 
(iii) If ACC(K] => K2) = X then ACC(K]) = X and ACC(K2) = X U ADR(K]) 
(iv) If ACC([x] . . .  xn I fP/ o  • • • •  CAn]) = X then ACC(fPj) = X  U {xJ . . . .  ,xn} (l s i s m) 
(v) If ACC(K] ; K2) = X then ACC(K]) = X and ACC(K2) = X U  ADR(K]) 
In order to illustrate the procedure we compute the discourse referents ac­
cessible from y = x in (25) : Since ACC«25» = 0 by definition. we find with rule 
(iv) that the set of referents accessible from (25) 's only condition is 0 ;  rule (iv) tells 
us that. since x is an active discourse referent of this conditions's antecedent. 
ACC( [y I funny-place y. y = x]) = 0 U {x} = {x} and a second application of rule 
(iv) shows that ACC(y = x) = {x,y} . If x occurs in some atomic condition (i.e. con­
dition of the form Pt or t]Rt2 or t] = t2) of K from which x is not accessible. we say 
that x is free in K. If K does not contain any free discourse referents K is called a 
proper DRS. 
Our definition of the semantics of the DRT language may at first blush seem 
different from the one given in Kamp [1981 ] .  or Kamp & Reyle [1993]. although in 
fact (modulo our addition of the sequencing operator. which will have relational 
composition as its semantics10) it will be equivalent. For reasons of conciseness and 
easy generalisation we shall give a definition inspired by the one given in 
Groenendijk & Stokhof [ 1991 ] . 1 1  Let M = (D, l> be a first-order model with do­
main D and interpretation function I and lett g and h range over finite assignments. 
i .e. finite partial maps from the set of discourse referents into D. Define I Itl Vto be 
J(x) if t is the discourse referent x and x E dom(/). and define I I�V to be I(c) if t is the 
constant c. If /(x) is undefined I IxlV will also remain undefined. Write f{xJ . . • .  ,xn}g if 
Ie;;, g and dom(g) = dom(/) U {x] • • • •  ,xn}. We define the extension I IIPI I of a condition 
fP to be a set of assignments and the extension I IKI I  of a DRS K to be a binary rela­
tion between assignments by means of the following induction. 12 
DEFINITION (DRT semantics) . 
I IPlII = {II I I�V is defined & I I � lf E I(P)} 
I I t]Rt2 1 1  = {II  I I t] IV and I I t2 1Vare defined & ( I I t] lV. l l t2 11'> E I(R)} 
l i t] = t2 1 1  = {II l it] I V and I I t21Vare defined & l i t] I V = I I t2 1 11} 
Il-'KlI = {l1 -.3g if, g) E I IKl I } 
1 1K] v K21 1  = {l1 3g(if, g) E I IK] I I  v if, g) E I IK21 1)} 
1 1K] => K21 1  = {II Vg(if, g) E I IK] I I  --+ 31z (g, h) E I IK21 1)} 
I I [xb · · ·,xn I fP] . · · · .CAnl l l  = {if, g) I f{x] . . .  · ,xn}g & g  E I IfP] I I  n . . . n I lCAnI l } 
1 1K] ; K2 1 1  = {if, g) 1 3h(if, Jz) E I IK] I I  & (h, g) E I IK21 1)} 
A proper DRS K is true iff the empty map 0 is an element of the domain of 
I IKlI, or. in other words. iff some g with the universe of K as its domain is in the ex­
tension of all conditions of K. 
The present definition gives us the possibility to define a natural notion of 
equivalence in meaning: two DRSs or conditions are called equivalent iff their ex­
tensions coincide. It is easy to see that [ I -.K]l v [ I K] => K2] is equivalent with 
K] => K2• and hence that Roberts' ( 18), discussed in the previous section. is equiva-
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lent with the simpler ( 1 9) .  The reader may also note that K v [xJ . · . .  ,xn I IPj . • • • •  /Pm] 
and K v [xj . . . . ,xn I -.K, IP} • • . . •  IPm] are equivalent. This means that the revised con­
struction rule A which we have considered in the previous section would give an 
output that is not semantically different from the output we get from the standard 
DRT construction rules. Similarly. since [ I -.K} ]  � K2 i s  equivalent with Kj v K2• 
adopting rule B would have no semantic effects either. There is a semantic differ­
ence between (6) and (7) though. and since we want a version of DRT in which 
double negations can be cancelled we shall define a new negation in the next section. 
3. Double Negation DRT 
The basic problem with negation in standard DRT is that it is not a flip-flop 
operation like its cousin in ordinary logic. Even the very syntax of negation discour­
ages flip-flop behaviour: if K is a box. -.K is a condition and there is no comparable 
operator which takes us from conditions to boxes again. In our variant of DRT­
Double Negation DRT -we remedy this and let the negation -K of a box K itself be 
a box. This is our only addition and we have removed the original negation. so that 
the syntax of Double Negation DRT looks as follows. 
IP . . -
K . . -
Pt I tjRt2 I I} = t2 I K] v K2 I K} � K2 
[Xj " ,xn I IPj . . .  · .IPm] I Kj ; K2 I -K 
We interpret this language by borrowing a technique from partial logic. 
Conditions will as before have an extension which consists of a set of partial as­
signments . but with each DRS K two relations between assignments will be associ­
ated. its extension I IKI I+ and its anti-extension I IKI I-. In the definition below we give 
the semantics of Double Negation DRT. The idea is that all conditions. except those 
of the form Kj v K2 . have a semantics that does not differ from the one given in the 
previous set-up and that the semantics of Kj v K 2 is no different from that of 
-Kj � K2. The extension of a non-negated box K is as before. but its anti-exten­
sion is defined to be equal to the extension of [ I -.K] in the previous set-up. 
Negation is now indeed a flip-flop operator and switches between extensions and 
anti-extensions. 
DEFINITION (Double Negation DRT semantics). 
IJPIII = {f 1 1 1 �V is defined & 1 I � lf E I(P) } 
I I tjRt21 1 = {f l l l tj lVand I I t2 1Vare defined & ( l I tj lV. l l t2 11'> E I(R)} 
I I tj = t2 1 1  = {f l l l tl lVand I I t2 1Vare defined & I Itj lV = I It2 1 11} 
I IKj v K21 1 = {f l  't/g«(f, g) E I IK1 1 I - ...... 3h (g, /z) E I IK21 1+)} 
I IKj � K21 1 = {f l  't/g«(f, g) E I IKl l I + ...... 311 (g, h) E I IK2 1 1+)} 
I I [Xj · ·.xn I IPj . · · ·./Pm] I I+ = {(f, g) I f{xj . · · · ,xn}g & g E I IIPj l 1  n . . .  n 1 11Pm1 1 } 
I I [Xj · · .xn I IPj . · · ·.IPml l l- = {(f,/) 1 -.3g(f{xl . · · · .xn}g & g E I IIPj l l  n . . . n I IIPml l)} 
I IKj ; K21 1+ = {(f, g) 1 3h«(f, h) E I IKj l l+ & (II, g) E I IK2 1 1+)} 
I IKj ; K21 1- = {(f,/) 1 -.3g3h«(f, g) E I IK} I I+ & (g, h) E I IK21 1+)} 
I I-KJI+ = I IKJI-
I I-KJI- = I IKJI+ 
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As before, two conditions are said to be equivalent iff their extensions coin­
cide. Boxes Kj and K2 are equivalent iff I IKj l l+  = I IK2 1 1+ and I IKj l l- = I IK2 1 1-. It is im­
mediate that --K is equivalent with K, whence the name 'Double Negation DRT' .  
In the definition of accessibility a little care must be taken for the following 
reason. Clearly, in [x I mall x] ; [y I zunbrella y, x owns y] the first occurrence of x 
should be accessible to the condition x owns y. (Note that the DRS is equivalent to 
[x y I man x, umbrella y, x owns y] . ) But in -[x I man x] ;[y I umbrella y, x owns y] 
this should not be the case, while in --[x I man x] ;[y I lunbrella y, x owns y] the ac­
cessibility should be restored again. To get this right we do not only define the set 
of active discourse referents of a given DRS this time, we also define its set of pas­
sive discourse referents. The following clauses do the job. 
ADR([xj . • . xn 1 1Pj . · · · ,lPmD = {Xj , · · · ,xn} 
PDR([xj . . .  xn I lPj ,  . . .  ,lPmD = 0 
ADR(Kj ; K2) = ADR(Kj) U ADR(K2) 
PDR(Kj ; K2) = 0 
ADR( -K) = PDR(K) 
PDR(-K) = ADR(K) 
Accessibility in K can now be defined in a straightforward way by setting 
ACC(K) = 0 and computing the accessible discourse referents of subDRSs and 
subconditions with the help of the following rules. 
(i) If ACC(Kj v K2) = X then ACC(K j ) = X and ACC(K2) = X U  PDR(Kj )  
(ii) If ACC(Kj � K2) = X then ACC(Kj) = X and ACC(K2) = X U ADR(Kj) 
(iii) If ACC([xj . . .  xn I lPj ,  . . .  ,lPmD = X then ACC(lPi) = X U {Xj , . . .  ,xn} (l s i s m) 
(iv) If ACC(Kj ; K2) = X then ACC(Kj) = X and ACC(K2) = X U  ADR(Kj) 
(v) If ACC(-K) = X then ACC(K) = X 
Again, an occurrence of x in an atomic condition IP in K is said to be free in 
K iff x tt ACC( IP). An occurrence of x in an atomic condition IP in a condition 'I/J is 
free in 'I/J iff it is free in [ I 'I/J] .  A DRS K is proper iff no occurrence of a discourse 
referent in K is free in K. A proper DRS is true if 0 is an element of the domain of 
its extension, false if 0 is an element of the domain of its anti-extension. The fol­
lowing lemma is of practical importance. 
MERGING LEMMA. 
[Xj · ·..xn I lPj , · · · ,lPm] ;[yj · · ·Yk I 'l/Jj ,  . . .  ,'l/Jj] 
is equivalent with 
[Xj · ·..xnYj · · ·yk I lPj . · · ·.lPm.'l/Jj . · · ·.'I/J). 
provided no referent in yj • . . . • yk is free in any of 1Pj . . . . •  lPm. 
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4. Applications 
Since in this section we want to show how our new version of DRT deals 
with the kind of sentences that we have encountered in the first section. we must 
make clear how its construction algorithm works. Fortunately we can borrow many 
rules from the standard approach. The basic set-up is as follows (compare the fol­
lowing rule for the global structure of DRS construction with that of Kamp & Reyle 
[1993 .  p. 86]) . 
CONSTRUCTION ALGORITHM 
Input: a discourse Sj • . . .  ,sn 
the empty DRS KO = D 
For i = 1 to n do: 
( i) Let Ki* = Ki_1  ;[D . 13 Go to (ii) . 
(ii) Keep on applying construction rules to each reducible condition of 
Kj* until a DRS Kj is obtained that only contains irreducible 
conditions. 
Applying one step of this algorithm to (5) . reprinted as (26) below. gives 
(27) as an output. 
(26) It is not true that John didn't  bring an umbrella. It was purple and it stood in 
the hallway. 
(27) D; It is not true that John didn ' t bring an umbrella 
In (27) we encounter a negation and a proper name. For these we have con­
struction rules that are slightly different from their standard variants. They are for­
mulated as follows. 
NEGATION RULE. Upon encountering any form of linguistic negation. I prefix the box that the condition containing the negation belongs to with -and remove the lin uistic ne ation. I 
PROPER NAME RULE. Upon encountering a proper name a, replace a 
with a new discourse referent x and prefix the entire DRS under construc­
tion with fx I a = xl . 
This exhausts our changes to the construction algorithm. An application of 
the negation rule to (27) gives (28) and a subsequent application of the proper name 
rule (29) .  In the latter we may (if we wish) merge [x I john = x] and the empty box 
[ I ] to [x I john = x] . according to the merging lemma of the previous section. This 
gives (30) and with a second application of the negation rule we obtain (3 1) . 
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D; - I  John didn 't bring an umbrella 
x didn' t bring an umbrella 
1 ;olm = x I ; - x didn 't bring an umbrella 
1 ;olm = x I ; - - x brought an  umbrella 
At this crucial point we may cancel the double negation, with (32) as a result, 
and an application of the standard rule for indefinites brings us to (33) .  Now the 
Merging Lemma can be applied, so that we get (34) . 
(32) 
(33) 
(34) 
1 ;olm = x I ; x brought an  umbrella 
rx--I. �mbrella y bJ x brought y 
x y 
john = x 
umbrella y 
x brought y 
Since there are no more reducible conditions now, the construction algorithm 
prescribes attaching a new box with the second sentence of our discourse as its only 
condition. The result is given in (35) . Clearly, since y is accessible from this new 
condition, both occurrences of it can be resolved as y. 
(35) x y 
john = x 
umbrella y , It was purple and it stood in the hallway 
x brought y 
This shows that our version of DRT treats double negations as holes for 
anaphora. That it treats single negations as plugs can be i l lustrated from the treat­
ment of (36) . 14  Since the only di fference between the first sentence of (26) and that 
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of (36) is that the latter lacks a negation, it is obvious that the construction algorithm 
outputs (37) instead of (33) for this sentence. This box can no further be reduced 
and if the second sentence of (36) is added, as in (38) , we find that the two occur­
rences of it cannot be resolved as y since the latter referent is not accessible. 
(36) John didn't bring an umbrella. *It was purple and it stood in the hallway. 
(37) �. - �mbrella y ' x brought y 
(38) y 
umbrella y , it was purple and it 
x brought y stood in the hallway 
This brings us to the treatment of 'bathroom' sentences. Supposing that the 
construction algorithm assigns (40) to ( 1 2) (here reprinted as (39» , we see that 
these sentences no longer form a problem. Since x is an active discourse referent of 
[x I bathroom x, in this hOllse x] , it is a passive discourse referent of its negation. 
This means that it will be accessible from the second disjunct, so that we can resolve 
it as x. The result is shown in (41 ) .  Note that this last box is equivalent to (19) 
(reprinted as (42» , so that (39) is predicted to be equivalent with (43) .  
(39) Either there's no bathroom in this house, or it' s in a funny place 
(40) x 
- bathroom x v it 's in a funny place 
in this house x 
(41 ) x y 
- bathroom x v funny place y 
in this house x y = x  
(42) x y 
bathroom x => ftmny place y 
in this house x y = x  
(43) If there' s  a bathroom in this house it 's in a funny place 
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A final word on representations. In this paper we have used a representation 
language that extends the familiar DRT language and for some discourses the DRS 
that we obtain after applying the construction algorithm wil l not be equivalent to a 
DRS of the old language. Thus while the DRS for the first sentence of (26) turned 
out to be part of the old language, the box in (37) could not be so reduced. 
Theoretically there is no problem here, but since discourses with an alternation of 
negated and non-negated sentences tend to get rather long DRSs and also for the 
sake of comparison with results the standard DRT set-up, we may nevertheless want 
to use the old forms. To this end we may reintroduce the 'old' DRT negation into 
the new language, stipulate that -,K is a condition if K is a box, and give the follow­
ing semantics. 
I I-,KlI = {f 1 -,3g if, g) E I IKl I +} 
The notion of accessibility is extended in the obvious way. We now have the 
following useful lemma which has a simple proof. 
SINGLE NEGATION LEMMA 
K =-> -[xl · · ·Xn 1 1P1 , . . . ,/Pm] 
-[xl · · ·xn 1 1P1 , • • •  ,lPm] =-> K 
K ; -[xl · · ·xn 1 1Pj . • • •  ,/Pm] 
-[xl · · ·xn 1 1P1 , • • •  ,lPm] ; K 
is equivalent with K =-> [ I -,[xl · · ·xn 1 1Pj . . . . ,/Pml] is equivalent with [ I -,[xl · · ·xn I IPJ . • • •  ,/Pm]] =-> K 
is equivalent with K ;  [ I -'[xl · · ·xn 1 1Pj . • • •  ,/Pm]] 
is equivalent with [ I -,[x 1 · ·  .xn 1 1P1 , · ·  . ,/Pm]] ; K 
Since we can cancel double negations, since we can trade disjunctions for 
implications via the equi valence between K 1 v K 2 and -K 1 =-> K 2 and in virtue of the 
properties of the construction algorithm, we can now reduce our new DRSs to the 
old ones. The procedure is illustrated for (37) below. To this DRS the Single 
Negation Lemma applies, and we get (44). A last application of the Merging Lemma 
results in (45), the form that we are used to associate with the first sentence of (36). 
(44) 
(45) 
bJ y ; ..... umbrella y john = x x brought y 
x 
john 20 x 
y 
..... umbrella y 
x brought y 
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Endnotes 
* We would like to thank Nick Asher, David Beaver, Greg Carlson, Robin 
Cooper, Paul Dekker, Klaus von Heusinger, Makoto Kanazawa, William Ladusaw, 
Luuk Lagerwerf, Mieke Rats , Craige Roberts, Leonoor Oversteegen, Stanley Peters 
and Carel van Wijk for comments and criticisms. 
1. Examples ( 1 )-(4) are taken from Karttunen' s  original paper (Karttunen 
[ 1976]) .  
2. E.g.  Chierchia [ 1 992] ,  Groenendijk & Stokhof [ 1 99 1 ] ,  Kamp & Reyle 
[ 1993] .  
3 .  W e  assume that negative verbs such a s  Jail and Jorget should be analysed with 
the help of a negation (see e.g. Karttunen & Peters [ 1979] for a similar analysis). 
4. Roberts [ 1989] attributes this sentence to Barbara Partee. In Evans [1977] we 
find Either John does not own a donkey, or he keeps it very quiet. 
5. For a discussion of the issue of accessibili ty in disjunctions see section 2.3 . 1 
(pp. 185-190) of this work. 
6. In fact, in a sense that will be made precise in section 2, (17) and (13) are 
equivalent in meaning and the new rule that in construing the DRS for a disjunction 
we should add the negation of the DRS for the first disjunct as a condition to the 
DRS for the second does not give us any output that is semantically different from 
the output of the original construction rule. 
7 Roberts uses a modal box instead of an implication, to be quite precise, but 
this is immaterial for our present purposes. 
8. In section 4 below we shall  give a slightly different analysis of disjunctions. 
We shall not change the DRS construction rule for disjunctions, but the semantics 
for the symbol v will be altered in such a way that A or B will be semantically 
equivalent to if not A then B. In  an earlier version of this paper our analysis of 
'bathroom' sentences was based on Kamp & Reyle's  analysis plus our solution to 
the double negation problem. We wish to thank Paul Dekker for insisting that the 
equivalence between A or B and if not A then B should be retained. 
9. This is the same as the conjunction operation in Groenendijk  & Stokhof 
[ 1991 ] .  
10. This is  the standard semantics of sequencing- see Pratt [1976]. 
1 1 . See definition 26 in Groenendijk & Stokhof's [ 1991] .  
12. The definition that is  given here is very close to Groenendijk & Stokhof's 
[ 1991 ]  definition 26, but we follow the standard DRT set-up by 
(i) using finite (and hence partial) assignments instead of total assignments, 
(ii) disallowing what are called reassignments. 
The use of finite assignments has been argued for extensively by Fernando [1992] . 
As for (ii) , note that our defini tion of f{ i }g has the consequence that for example in  
[x I donkey x] - [x I grey xl the occurrence of  x in the universe of the second box 
has no effect at all and that the condition is equivalent to [x I donkey xl _ [ I grey x] . 
In the Groenendijk & Stokhof set-up it will be equivalent to [x I donkey x] -
[y I grey y] . Of course, such conditions will not be generated by the standard DRT 
construction algorithm. 
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1 3 .  A more precise account would have the syntactic analysis of Si as the contents 
of the new box. Compare Kamp & Reyle [ 1 993] .  
14. In this respect our  negation is d ifferent from the dynam ic negations 
considered in  Groenendijk & Stokhof [ 1 990] and Dekker [ 1993] .  While these 
negations correctly predict that a double negation does not block anaphora they also 
predict that a single negation does not. 
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